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ABSTRACT: We present a model to investigate the competitive implications of elec-
tronic secondary markets that promote concurrent selling of new and used goods on
a supply chain. In secondary markets where suppliers cannot directly utilize used
goods for practicing intertemporal price discrimination and where transaction costs
of resales is negligible, the threat of cannibalization of new goods by used goods
become significant. We examine conditions under which it is optimal for suppliers to
operate in such markets, explaining why these markets may not always be detrimen-
tal for them. Intuitively, secondary markets provide an active outlet for some high-
valuation consumers to sell their used goods. The potential for such resales lead to an
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increase in consumers’ valuation for a new good, leading them to buy an additional
new good. Given sufficient heterogeneity in consumer’s affinity across multiple sup-
pliers’ products, the “market expansion effect” accruing from consumers’ cross-product
purchase affinity can mitigate the losses incurred by suppliers from the direct “canni-
balization effect.” We also highlight the strategic role that used goods commission
set by the retailer plays in determining profits for suppliers. We conclude the paper
by empirically testing some implications of our model using a unique data set from
the online book industry, which has a flourishing secondary market.
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: electronic markets, information goods, market segmenta-
tion, quality degradation, supply chain, used goods.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) REDUCES the search and transaction costs for buy-
ers and sellers to locate and trade products, and can thereby facilitate the creation of
technology-mediated electronic exchanges. These Internet-based exchanges allow
sellers to easily reach a worldwide market and allow buyers to easily locate items that
frequently would be unavailable in traditional physical stores. Consumer-to-consumer
exchanges represent one prominent area where the low search and transactions costs
in IT-enabled markets have enabled product exchanges that would not have been
viable in a comparable bricks-and-mortar environment. The recent establishment of
electronic exchanges by some retailers to sell used goods has resulted in a conten-
tious debate about their potential affect on suppliers. For instance, publishers claim
that e-tailing giant Amazon.com’s high-profile dissemination of used books eats into
their often limited royalties and shortens the duration they have to generate new book
sales. This has prompted fears that publishers will be forced to raise the prices of new
books, in order to extract as high a price as they can, during the onetime sale of a
book.
Amazon has argued that its electronic secondary markets actually spur new good
sales. Complicating this argument is the fact that Amazon earns about the same from
selling a new book as the commission it generates from the sale of a used book on its
marketplace [24]. Thus the incentives of the retailers and the publishers are not aligned.
In fact, revenue from the commissions generated from secondhand goods (such as
books, CDs, DVDs, and packaged software products) are proving to be a money-
spinner for Amazon, and it is expanding its policy of paying commissions to its affili-
ates to include the sale of used goods.
A salient feature of these information goods is that, once bought, many consumers
derive a limited utility from keeping them and are willing to resell them if the transac-
tion costs are negligible. Prior research has shown that IT-enabled electronic markets
reduce transaction costs and search costs [3]. For buyers and sellers alike, electronic
networks such as the Internet reduce the transaction cost of finding each other without
regard to geographical constraints. In addition, buyers incur low search costs when
they compare prices and the quality attributes of new and used goods. Since quality
05 ghose.pmd 8/26/2005, 1:10 PM92
EFFECT OF ELECTRONIC SECONDARY MARKETS ON THE SUPPLY CHAIN     93
depreciation in such goods is usually minimal, consumers find it increasingly profit-
able or less costly to buy them. Basically, lower prices and tangible quality attributes
make them perfectly suitable for trading on such electronic secondary markets.
The nature of durable good markets has long been the subject of active research in
economics and marketing. However, the digital economy is changing the nature of
interactions in these markets [11]. For example, we observe the concurrent selling of
new and used goods with offers of both types of goods being retrieved in response to
a user query as shown in Figure 1. In this setting, there is a strong possibility that used
goods can cannibalize the sales of new goods.
Literature Review
THE DIFFICULTY OF MAINTAINING THE MONOPOLY POWER on durable goods is due in
part to the problem of time-inconsistency, first pointed out by Coase [8], who conjec-
tured that if a firm were to exploit its residual demand in future periods, then rational
consumers would anticipate this behavior and price would fall to the competitive
level rapidly.1 The interrelationship between the markets for new and used goods was
Figure 1. Amazon’s Secondary Market with Different Price–Quality Offerings for a Book
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first pointed out by Benjamin and Kormendi [4]. They argued that a monopolist can
maintain market power, despite an inability to commit to future production, by re-
stricting the used market.2 Using the textbook market as an example, Miller [16]
suggests that the opening of secondary markets will force publishers to increase new
good prices in order to extract the maximum possible profit from the onetime sale of
a new good. Liebowitz [15] delineates conditions under which a monopolist will
produce goods with a lower durability than under competition. Further research in
this area has formalized Coase’s conjecture (e.g., Bulow [6], who shows that a mo-
nopolist can avoid the commitment problem by leasing as opposed to selling) and
pointed out conditions under which it does not hold. For example, Bond and Samuelson
[5] show that depreciation reduces the monopolist’s incentive to cut price. Kahn [14]
shows a similar result by assuming an upward-sloping marginal cost schedule instead
of constant marginal costs. Rust [19] solves for consumer behavior and prices for
used goods in a durable goods market, with stochastic depreciation. The main argu-
ment of these earlier papers [16] is that the secondhand markets need not hurt the
manufacturer because they will anticipate the resale value of their product and thereby
increase the new good price accordingly.
But a more recent stream of literature [1, 13, 22] has argued that the secondary
market also creates a substitution effect that the models above ignore. The substitu-
tion effect accrues from the fact that new goods face competition from used goods.
Accordingly, some new good consumers will shift to the used good market because
of such a substitution effect. Thus the prior literature highlights two countervailing
effects of secondary markets. On one hand, used versions of the durable are viewed
as substitutes for the newly produced durable good. On the other hand, the price of a
durable good is the present discounted value of the benefits stream associated with
that good such as a resale. Hence, the optimal extent of any type of interference is
conditioned by the relative magnitude of these two effects. An important aspect of
the theoretical models in prior literature is that they have explicitly accounted for
transaction costs incurred in resales, given that these costs are significant in the physical
world. Anderson and Ginsburgh [1] show the monopolist could benefit from impos-
ing a variable transaction fee on buyers of used goods. Waldman [22] and Hendel and
Lizzeri [13] show that firms use the lease-only policy of reducing the availability of
used goods. Aron and Sundararajan [2] highlight how installed base affects a firm’s
incentive to have a secondary market. Porter and Sattler [17] introduce a transaction
cost for sellers of secondhand goods and show that the volume of trade increases with
imperfect substitutability. For a complete survey of the literature on durable goods,
see Waldman [23].
Empirical work on used good markets includes a stream of literature looking at
adverse selection in used good markets [10]. Genesove [10] finds only modest evi-
dence of adverse selection in dealer auction markets for used cars. Ghose et al. [12]
empirically estimate the net loss to publishers due to the cannibalization effect of
secondary electronic markets on new book sales. One major contribution of this pa-
per is to propose an alternate rationale as to how secondary markets can mitigate such
losses that accrue to suppliers of information goods such as book publishers, record
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labels, and movie studios. Although the sale of used goods is allowed under copy-
right law, the piracy literature provides many interesting parallels to our work. Piracy
may also increase legitimate demand by enabling the producer to credibly commit to
not reduce its price in the future [21]. One key difference between pirated and used
information goods is the nature of the good itself. Whereas most pirated goods are
digital in nature, information goods traded on secondary markets are generally tan-
gible. We also explore the role of used good commissions and discuss associated
managerial insights. Specifically, we examine the following: (1) Does the sale of
used goods ever benefit suppliers when they cannot accrue any direct profits from
secondary market sales? (2) What is the effect of used goods on new good prices and
profits? (3) What strategic implications does the used good commission set by the
retailer have for suppliers?
Key Results
PREVIOUS RESEARCH HAS SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCED our understanding of how
durable goods markets function. In contrast to products such as automobiles, we con-
sider information goods, such as books, CDs, DVDs, or software products, where
transaction frequency is much higher because transaction and search costs are virtu-
ally absent in IT-enabled electronic secondary markets. The success of electronic
secondary markets for these types of durable goods, such as those hosted by Amazon
or eBay, motivates the need to go beyond existing models. Our model simultaneously
accommodates commonly observed phenomena, such as active secondary markets,
heterogeneity in consumer preferences, endogenous demand functions, quality de-
preciation, and the degree of product substitutability between competing goods. Be-
fore discussing our model, we highlight three features that distinguish our work from
prior research and lead to our main contributions.
First, in our model, we consider two different types of a similar good, each being
sold by two different suppliers via one common retailer. There exists an underlying
heterogeneity in consumers’ purchasing affinity for both goods. Hence the presence
of secondary markets not only expands the demand for a specific type of good but
also opens up the possibility of some consumers purchasing a second good of another
type. The “duopolistic” nature of the market motivates suppliers to compete even
more strongly on prices.3 Further, the presence of a secondary market allows some
consumers to replace their used goods of one type with new goods of the other type.
We show that the existence of the secondary market leads to an increase in their
valuation for the new good, which in turn can lead to higher supplier profits.
Second, in our model, suppliers do not accrue any direct gains from used good
sales and hence they cannot directly use secondhand goods for practicing intertemporal
price discrimination. The retailer that acts as an intermediary in our model sets the
used good commission and captures all direct secondary market benefits. Conse-
quently, its interests are not aligned with those of the supplier. In such a scenario, the
used good commission plays a strategic role by determining the precise change in
consumers’ implicit disposable income from a resale. From a managerial perspec-
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tive, we show that despite the threat of cannibalization of new goods by used goods,
a retailer has a strong incentive to establish a secondary market. While this is always
detrimental for suppliers in a monopoly, a duopolistic secondary market leaves them
better off, for a wide range of parameters. Further, we show that although increasing
the used good commission affects suppliers favorably in a monopoly, it affects them
adversely in a competitive scenario.
Third, some consumers derive a positive utility from holding the used good. This
feature, along with the duopolistic market structure where a supplier wants to sell its
goods in competitor’s market, enables suppliers to decrease their prices in the pres-
ence of a secondary market. This is in contrast to the conventional perspective that
new good prices tend to increase in the presence of a used good market. Further, we
point out that irrespective of the nature of the market (monopolistic or duopolistic),
an increase in the new good price leads to an increase in the used good price. Using
data from Amazon, we provide empirical evidence that corroborates these results.
Model
Firms
THE MODEL CONSISTS OF TWO SUPPLIERS, SA and SB, selling goods A and B, respec-
tively, through one common retailer, to a unit mass of consumers, each in two differ-
ent markets. Suppliers are assumed not to have any capacity limits. In our model, one
can think of the two suppliers as two publishers or two record labels selling two
different books or CDs, respectively. The product i, (i ∈ A, B) that is sold by each
supplier is a durable that provides two periods of service. Thus a new good provides
service for two periods, irrespective of the period in which it is bought. A good is new
when it is sold in period 1 and the same good is classified as used in period 2. In the
first period, only new goods are available. In the second period, the retailer opens a
used good market where consumers can buy and sell used goods with minimal trans-
action costs. The retailer sells both the goods, A and B, supplied by each of the re-
spective suppliers. Whenever the consumer sells a used good (irrespective of whether
it is type A or B), the retailer gets a commission kU (where 0 < kU < 1) per used good
sold, whereas the rest (1 – kU) is the gain to the consumer. Similarly it gets kN (where
0 < kN < 1) per new good sold, with the rest (1 – kN) going to the supplier. We also
assume that the marginal cost of production of each good is zero for the suppliers.
This is true for a variety of information goods such as books, CDs, DVDs, videos,
journals, shrink-wrapped software, and so on.
Consumers
Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations of the good. Let θ be a consumer’s
marginal valuation for the quality of a good, where θ ∈ [0, 1]. For any given quality,
a consumer with a higher θ is willing to pay more for the product than one with a
lower θ.
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Buying a used good entails a cost of some degree of quality degradation. Let 1
denote the quality of the new good and q denote the quality of the used good in period
2, where 0 < q < 1. Thus q can be interpreted as the degree of intertemporal quality
degradation of the new good over two periods. If a consumer purchases a product of
quality q at price p, his or her utility is U(θ) = θq – p. That is, the increase in utility
with quality is higher for consumers with higher valuations.
In our model, there are two types of consumers. Type A consumers have θ valua-
tion for good A and αθ valuation for good B where α ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, type B
consumers have θ valuation for good B and αθ valuation for good A. The parameter
α is the degree of consumers’ affinity for the other product such that the higher the
value of α, the more intense is the competition between the two suppliers for induc-
ing the consumers to buy their goods. When α = 0, consumers strictly prefer the
specific good i ∈ (A, B) according to their respective types. However, α > 0 implies
consumers have an incentive to buy both goods. In this paper, we refer to α as the
cross-product purchase affinity parameter.
Having bought a new good in period 1, consumers can either hold onto the good or
sell it as a used good in the market in the second period. Intuitively, we would expect
that for the same θ, a consumer holding the good will derive less utility than a used
good buyer. Therefore, we assume that while the buyer of a used good derives a
utility of θq, the holder of the used good derives a utility of θh, where h < q. To
motivate this discussion, consider a good such as a DVD or a fiction novel. Once a
consumer has seen the movie or read the novel, his or her utility from the product
content will decline. As such, he or she will derive a lower utility from holding the
good. Conversely, a buyer of the same used DVD or novel can derive a much higher
utility from the content of the good. Hence, depending on the prices of both goods
and consumers’ relative preference for each good (α), they may choose to buy one or
both the goods. The game is modeled as a multistage process across two periods. We
consider a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game using backward induction.
No Electronic Secondary Market
WE BEGIN WITH THE BENCHMARK CASE when there is no market for used goods. This
allows us to do comparative statics when an active used good market exists. We
consider two separate cases:
1. Case 1: “Monopoly Without Used Goods Case.” In this case, consumers pur-
chase, at most, one good from either supplier, according to their type i, i ∈
(A, B).
2. Case 2: “Duopoly Without Used Goods Case.” In this case, some consumers
are interested in purchasing both goods, one from each supplier i, i ∈ (A, B).
Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to these scenarios as the “no used good
case” for both monopolistic and duopolistic markets. We solve for the equilibrium
price in both cases. We will then perform a similar analysis in the presence of a used
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good market and do some comparative statics. These comparisons enable us to high-
light the effect of a secondary market on suppliers and the retailer.
Case 1: Monopoly Without Used Goods
Since there is no secondary market, consumers can only do the following: buy the
new good (N) in the first period and hold it (H) in the second period. In the second
period, for a consumer of type θ, the utility derived from holding it is simply θh. We
denote the price of a new good in this scenario as PNmn, where the superscript N de-
notes that it is the price of a new good and the subscript mn denotes that it is the
“monopoly without used goods case.” A consumer of type θ in each market will buy
a good as long as θ(1 + h) – PNmn ≥ 0 ⇔ θ′ = PNmn/1 + h, where θ′ is the consumer
indifferent to buying a good and not buying at all. Here, PNmn can be interpreted as the
monopoly price that SA(SB) offers to all consumers.4 At this price, the demand for a
new good (both A and B) is Dn(PNmn, h) = 1 – PNmn/1 + h. The profit for each supplier
is ΠNmn(S) = (1 – (PNmn/1 + h))(1 – kN)PNmn from which the optimal price PN*mn = ((1 +
h)/2) is obtained. Each supplier makes a profit of
( )
( )
( )Nm N
h
S k
1
1 ,
4
+
Π = − (1)
whereas the total profit of the retailer from both the markets is
( )
( ) NN
m
h k
R
1
.
2
+
Π =
Note that the implicit assumption here is that consumers have a disposable income I
equal to at least the price of one new good—that is ((1 + h)kN)/4—to be able to pur-
chase the good.
Lemma 1 (Monopoly Prices Without Used Goods): For all α ∈ (0, 0.61), both
suppliers offer the monopoly price (PNmn, PNmn) and consumers buy, at most, one
good of their type.
For α ≥ 0.61, each supplier poaches into its rival’s market and a stiff price compe-
tition ensues.5 Hence, to focus on the implications of a secondary market on suppliers
and the retailer, we will consider the case of α ≤ 0.61 in the subsequent discussion
for the monopolistic market. It is also worth noting that if consumers did not derive
any utility from holding the good, then the optimal price PNmn suppliers could have
charged would have been equal to 1/2. The increased utility from holding the good is
what drives suppliers to charge the extra price h/2.
In the absence of a secondary market, the profit-maximizing prices for the retailer
and the suppliers are the same. However, when there is a secondary market, the strat-
egies for the retailer and suppliers change, because although the retailer still gets a
commission for each used good sold, the suppliers do not.6 It is this differential incen-
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tive for used good sales between suppliers and retailers and the consequent implica-
tions for equilibrium profits that we aim to explore in this paper.
Case 2: Duopoly Without Used Goods
Now, we consider the case when some consumers can purchase both goods. That is,
some consumers of type A are willing to also buy good B and vice versa. In the
previous equilibrium, we showed that both suppliers simultaneously offer monopoly
prices when consumers are buying one good according to their type. Clearly, the
suppliers’ pricing strategy will change when each supplier can sell its good in the
other’s market as well.
Let the subscript dn denote the duopoly market with no used goods. Suppose SA
offers price PNdn such that in a type B market, some consumers find it incentive com-
patible to buy both good A and B at lower prices, as long as it satisfies their indi-
vidual-rationality constraint. Hence, the type B market gets split into two segments,
such that the higher willingness to pay consumers buy both good B and good A,
whereas the remaining buyers buy only good B. It follows that all type B consumers
between θ1 and 1 also buy from SA. By symmetry, supplier SB will do the same in a
type A market by setting a price PNdn. We formally show that there exists a pure
strategy equilibrium in prices.
Lemma 2 (Duopoly Prices Without Used Goods): When some consumers can buy
two goods, the optimal price and supplier profits are given by PN*dn = (α(1 + h))/
(1 + α) and ΠdN(S) = (1 – kN)(α(1 + h)/(1 + α)), respectively.
It is critical to note that in order for consumers to buy both goods, they should have
a disposable income I equal to at least twice the price of a new good—that is, 2α(1 +
h)/(1 + α). If this is not so, then they can buy only one good, which will be sold at the
monopoly price as shown in the last section. Next, we show that when a secondary
market is established, the disposable income required to buy both goods reduces con-
siderably because consumers are able to trade their used good for some extra income.
This increases their valuation for a new good and, in turn, positively affects the
supplier’s and retailer’s profitability.7
Retailer Establishes an Electronic Secondary Market
IN THIS SCENARIO, CONSUMERS ARE AWARE that in period 1, only new goods are
available, whereas in period 2, both new and used goods are available. Consumers
who purchase the new good in period 1 always have the option of selling their used
good in a secondary market in period 2. Thus at the beginning of each period, when
consumers evaluate their needs over the two-period horizon, they can follow one of
five independent strategies laid out below. Let PUmn and PUms denote the new good and
used good prices, respectively, where the superscript U indicates the presence of a
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secondary market. The subscripts ms and mn denote a monopolist with and without
used good cases, respectively.
Let Ni, H, S, U, and I denote a single-period action, corresponding to buying a new
good of type i, holding onto a used good, selling a used good, buying a used good,
and remaining inactive by not buying any good. We state a general formulation of
underlying utility and then endogenously derive the consumer demand functions.8
Doing so enables us to get a better understanding of consumer strategies and the
trade-offs involved in choosing among the differentiated products. Similar to the pre-
vious section, we will again focus on two separate cases.
1. Case 3: “Monopoly with Used Goods Case.” Consumers are interested in pur-
chasing at most one good.
2. Case 4: “Duopoly with Used Goods Case.” Some consumers purchase both
goods.
Case 3: Monopoly with Used Goods
We next discuss a supplier’s problem of determining the optimal new good price
when the retailer establishes a used good market. We assume the used market is
competitive and neither the supplier nor the retailer has any direct control in setting
the used good price. Hence, a used good sale does not provide any explicit benefit to
the suppliers. When consumers buy, at most, one good, they buy their preferred good
according to the market type to which they belong. That is, consumers of type A(B)
buy good A(B). Therefore, the corresponding utilities derived from various action
strategies are as follows:
1. (NH): Buy new good in period 1 and hold onto the used good in period 2:
θ(1 + h) – PU
mn
.
2. (NS): Buy new good in period 1 and sell used good in period 2: θ – PU
mn
+ (1 –
kU)PUms.
3. (IU): Remain inactive in period 1 and buy used good in period 2: θq – PU
ms
.
4. Remain inactive in both periods: 0.
Figure 2 describes the segmentation of the market based on consumer action strat-
egies. Recall that in this case a consumer is interested in buying at most one good.
Note that the condition q(1 – kU) > h needs to hold for such a market segmentation.
Intuitively, this means that some consumers derive a higher utility from selling the
used good than holding onto it. Further, the holding utility also needs to be such that
any consumer finds it incentive compatible to hold on to a used good, instead of
selling it.9
Using the individual-rationality and the incentive-compatibility constraints, we
derive the three indifferent points that define the consumer market segments. The
market cutoffs are as follows:
( ) ( )U U U UU ms mn U ms msk P P k P P
h q q1 2 3
1 2
.
1
− − −
θ = θ = θ =
−
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Note that the number of consumers in any group is given by the length of that
segment. It is important to recognize that, in our model, based on suppliers’ pricing
strategies, the number of consumers in these groups will emerge endogenously. Since
the used good market is competitive, the price of used goods, ps, will also be endog-
enously determined. This ensures that the market-clearing conditions equalize sup-
ply and demand of used goods. All consumers from θ1 to θ2 are suppliers of used
goods. All consumers from θ2, θ3 create the demand for used goods. By equating
demand with supply, we get the market clearing used good price, PUms. The optimal
new good price, PU*mn, is derived from the supplier’s profit equation, after substitut-
ing for PUms. The supplier’s profit equation is given by ΠUm(S) = (1 – θ2)(1 – kN)PUmn.
From this equation, the optimal PU*mn set by the supplier and the market clearing used
good price PU*ms can be derived as
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
U UU
mn
U
k q q h k q
P
h q k q
*
1 1 1 3 2
2
− − + + −
=
+ −
(2)
U
ms
U
hq
P
h q k q
*
,=
+ − (3)
which gives the supplier’s profit as
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
U U NU U
m N mn
U
k q q h k q k
S k P
h q k q
*
1 1 1 3 2 1
1
24
⎛ ⎞− − + + − ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟Π = − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠+ −⎝ ⎠
(4)
and the retailer’s profits as
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
U
N UN mU
m
N U
hk q k q hk S
R
k h q k
2
1
.
1 2 1
− −Π
Π = +
− + −
(5)
Proposition 1 (New Good Price and Supply-Chain Profits): (i) The optimal new
good price, PUmn, in the monopolistic “used good” market is lower than the new
good price in a monopolistic “no used good” market, PNmn. (ii) While the suppli-
ers’ profits decrease with the establishment of a secondary market, there exists a
kU such that for all kU ≥ kN(q2 – h2))/q((2 – kN)h + kNq), the retailer’s profits
increases in a secondary market.
Figure 2. Consumer Consumption Classes in a Monopoly with Used Goods
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The presence of an active used goods market creates competition for new goods
because the option of buying used goods is now incentive-compatible for some con-
sumers who would have bought new goods before. This enhanced competition forces
suppliers to decrease new good prices in order to remain competitive with used goods.
Recall that the supplier cannot derive any benefit from the sale of used goods, since
all the used goods commission is forfeited to the retailer. In contrast to conventional
wisdom, we find that the price of a new good decreases from the case when there is
no used good market to when there is an active used good market. This is surprising,
but the intuition accrues from the fact that the existence of the NH segment discour-
ages suppliers from raising prices.10 Thus we point out that as long as some consum-
ers derive a positive utility from holding a used good, suppliers will not raise the new
good price, despite the establishment of a secondary market by an intermediating
retailer.
On the other hand, if we compare retailer profits in both cases, we observe that, in
general, retailer profits increase with the establishment of a secondary market. The
loss from lower profit margins per customer in NH and NS segments is more than
offset by the gain from additional sales in the IU segment. This result highlights why
retailers of durable goods who split the gains from used good sales with consumers
only (not with suppliers) have a strong incentive to open a secondary market.
Proposition 2 (Effect of Used Good Commission on Prices): The optimal new
good and used good price increases monotonically with an increase in used good
commission fees, kU.
The analysis above has interesting managerial and public policy implications. First,
even though secondary markets leave suppliers worse off, in general, the retailer is
better off by prudently setting the used good commission after observing the supplier’s
new good commission. More importantly, consumers are always better off. There-
fore, from a policy perspective, even though secondary markets are detrimental for
suppliers, they do enhance consumer welfare. Second, the analysis allows us to ob-
serve the effect of various parameters on firms’ optimal strategies. For example, re-
tailers such as Amazon will be interested in setting an optimal commission kU. When
the used good commission kU increases, the used good market shrinks in size while
the new good market expands. This leads to higher supplier profits. Although this
tends to lower profits for the retailer from used good sales, it is compensated by the
increased profits from the new good market. But importantly, unlike suppliers, the
retailer benefits twice from the NS segment: it earns the commission twice in the form
of kN and kU. Therefore, with a higher used good commission, eventually, the used
good market shrinks enough to start decreasing the retailer’s net profits. Clearly,
then, beyond a critical value of kU, the retailer’s incentive to increase kU is at odds
with that of the suppliers, who always prefer a shallow used good market. Formally,
the optimal kU for the retailer is shown below.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Used Good Commission): (i) The optimal retailer profit-
maximizing used good commission, kU, is given by kU* = ((q2 – h2)(1 + kN))/
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(q(q + 3h + kN(q – h))). (ii) Further, as the supplier’s new good commission kN
increases, the retailer’s optimal used good commission kU* also increases.
Intuitively, a higher kN implies the retailer generates more profit from the new good
market. Hence, its best response is to minimize the size of the used good market by
increasing kU, thereby making it less profitable for consumers to sell the used good.
Basically, by strategically increasing kU*, the retailer can alter the size of the NH
segment vis-à-vis the NS segment and thus make higher profits.11 This analysis high-
lights the effect of a secondary market on a monopolistic supplier, and a retailer’s
profits, as well as on consumer welfare. One key contribution is to analyze the com-
petitive implications when some consumers can buy both goods. We next analyze the
effect of a duopolistic used good market, wherein some consumers purchase both
goods.
Case 4: Duopoly with Used Goods
We are looking for two main insights. First, what is the effect on supplier profits
when they are able to sell goods in their competitors’ market as well? Second, what
will be the required disposable income for consumers to buy both goods? In this
section, we proceed to answer these questions by introducing the element of inter-
supplier competition in the presence of a used good market, because some consumers
are willing to buy two goods.
We continue with the stylized scenario of two symmetric suppliers, selling in two
different markets of equal size, reduced to a unit mass of one. Based on the strategies
outlined below, consumers are segmented into various consumption classes accord-
ing to their willingness to pay for the good. Recall that in this case, some consumers
are interested in buying two goods, one from each supplier, as long as it gives them a
positive surplus. This leads to the creation of a new segment, which we term NSN.
The dominant consumer strategies and corresponding consumer utility functions are
shown below.
1. (NiSNj): Buy new good A in period 1, sell used good in period 2 and buy new
good B: θ(1 + α + αh) – 2PU*dn + (1 – kU)PU*ds.
2. (NH): Buy new good in period 1 and hold onto the used good in period 2:
θ(1 + h) – PU*dn.
3. (IUi): Remain inactive in period 1 and buy used good in period 2: θq – PU*ds.
4. Remain inactive in both periods: 0.
Similar to the monopoly case, by equating the incentive-compatibility constraints
based on these four strategies, we derive the three indifference points that define the
consumer segments in each market, i or j, i, j ∈ (A, B), which are as follows:
( )j i i i jn U s n s si i ip k p p p p
h h h q q1 2 3
1
.
1
− − −
θ = θ = θ =
α+α − + −
05 ghose.pmd 8/26/2005, 1:10 PM103
104     GHOSE, TELANG, AND KRISHNAN
Note that as before, the grouping of consumers outlined above corresponds directly
to their overall valuations of the good. That is, consumers with higher valuations for
the good will tend to be on the right, followed by consumers with lower valuations in
the middle, and so on toward the left. This is shown in Figure 3. The class division
points are derived from the individual-rationality and the incentive-compatibility
constraints. Consumers in (1, θ1i) will follow NiSNj, consumers in (θ1i, θ2i) will follow
NiH, consumers in (θ2i, θ3i) will follow IUi, and those in (θ3i, 0) will follow II.
All consumers from 1 to θ1i are the suppliers of used goods. All consumers from
(θ2i, θ3i) create the demand for used goods. By equating the demand of used goods
with the supply, we get the market-clearing second period price of used goods PUids.
The optimal new good price, PU*idn, can be derived from the supplier’s profit equa-
tion, after substituting for PUids. Note that new good sales occur in the first two seg-
ments, that is, in the segments labeled NiSNj and NiH. Also, since consumers in NiSNj
segment buy from both the suppliers, each supplier also gets the NjSNi segment of the
competitor’s market. Hence, the supplier’s profit is given by
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )i i ijU i U U i i Ud N dn N dn N dnS k P k P k P1 1 1 21 1 1 1 1 .Π = −θ − + −θ − + θ −θ − (6)
This yields the optimal new good price as
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
i U U UU
dn
U
q k q h k q h q k h
P
h k q
2
*
2 1 2 4 2 2 1
.
2 1
α+ − − − + + − − α + α− − − α
=
+α+ α −
(7)
The expressions for optimal used price and supplier and retailer profits are given in
the Appendix. Before we perform comparative statics, the reader should note that the
new good prices and profits are increasing in α. This is because a higher α implies
that the NiSNj segment is willing to pay more for the good. Formally, we show the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Competitive New Good Price): The new good prices increase
monotonically with α, the consumers’ degree of preference for the other good,
but decrease with the used good commission, kU. Further, used good prices are
increasing with the new good prices.
In a monopolistic scenario, suppliers prefer a high kU because this leads to a smaller
used good market, which suits their interests. On the other hand, when some high-
valuation customers are willing to buy both the goods, suppliers prefer to have an
Figure 3. Consumer Consumption Classes in a Duopoly with Used Goods
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active used good market. This is because the existence of the NSN segment critically
depends on the ability of some consumers to sell the used good and extract the extra
income from the resale. Proposition 4 shows that kU has an adverse effect on new
good prices and profits. This is because with a higher kU, consumers get a reduced
benefit from selling the used good compared to holding it. Hence the NH segment
increases in size whereas the NSN segment shrinks. To compensate for the lower net
demand of new goods, the suppliers are forced to reduce their prices to sustain the
NSN segment, which, for the most part, reduces their profits. Therefore, unlike the
monopoly case, the suppliers now prefer a lower kU. On the other hand, the retailer is
interested in setting a higher kU in order to extract all the benefits from used good
sales. Again, this highlights that retailers and suppliers are incompatible in their in-
centives in selecting an optimal kU. Next, we will show that when the secondary
market is modeled as a duopolistic market, suppliers are not necessarily adversely
affected. Moreover, new good prices are generally lower in such markets.
Comparative Statics
Duopoly with Used Good Versus Duopoly Without Used Goods
ALTHOUGH WE GET CLOSED-FORM SOLUTIONS for the price and profit expressions,
the highly nonlinear equations do not yield easy analytical comparisons. Therefore,
we use numerical analysis to gain some insight. First, we point out the following:
Observation 1 (Supplier Profit Levels in “Duopolistic” Markets): For all α ≤
αm, supplier profits in the duopolistic used good market ΠdU(S) are higher than
profits in duopolistic no used good market ΠdN(S).
In other words, when some consumers buy both goods, then there exists an αm such
that for α ∈ [0, αm], suppliers are better off in the presence of a used good market. To
see this, first note that for low α, while the prices and profits in a duopolistic market
without used goods are very low, this is not necessarily true in a duopolistic used
good market. The reason is that the used good market allows consumers to sell their
goods, which increases their valuation for a new good. Hence, suppliers can extract
this increased valuation by charging somewhat higher prices than in the case without
a used good market. This is similar to the notion of “indirect appropriability,” as
pointed out in the prior literature.12
We note that ΠdU(S) > ΠdN(S) for low α—that is, suppliers are better off with a used
good market for lower values of α. Conversely, for higher values of α, we find that
ΠdU(S) < ΠdN(S). We first note that at α = 0, ΠdU(S) > ΠdN(S) = 0. Next, we note that at
α = 1, ΠdU(S) < ΠdN(S) = 0. Clearly, if the difference in the profit function under the
two scenarios were positive and monotonically increasing, then that would imply the
existence of an αm, such that suppliers are better off in the presence of a used good
market for all α ≤ αm. Since it is difficult to show this analytically, we use numerical
simulations to determine the values of αm.
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Observation 2 (Supplier’s Prices in the Used Good Market): For all α ∈ [αn, 1],
suppliers’ optimal new good price, PUdn, in the duopolistic used good market is
lower than the price in duopolistic no used good market, PNdn.
We find that for a wide range of α, the used goods marketplace actually leads to a
decrease in the price of new goods, rather than higher new good prices. One would
expect that since suppliers do not gain directly from the sale of used goods, they
would necessarily increase the new good prices to extract the maximum surplus from
the onetime sale, as previous research has noted [16]. Basically consumers’ affinity
for the second good induces suppliers to lower the price of the new good to gain
additional sales in the competing supplier’s market. By lowering their prices, suppli-
ers can now sustain and expand the NSN market segment, thereby accruing a higher
profit. We term this the market expansion effect. This brings down the new good
prices for a wide range of parameters.
Monopoly with Used Goods Versus Duopoly with Used Goods
Next, we compare the monopolistic used good market with the duopolistic one.
Proposition 5 (Optimal New Good Price Comparison): For all α ∈ [αdm, 1],
suppliers’ optimal new good price, PUdn, in the duopolistic used good market is
higher than the price in the monopolistic used good market, PUmn.
Similarly, we point out that for some α ∈ [αc, 1], suppliers’ profits, ΠdU(S), in a
duopolistic used good market are higher than the monopolistic used good market
profits, ΠmU(S). We know that at very low values of α, the new good price, PUdn, and
profits in a duopolistic market are very low. But the monopolistic price, PUmn, and
profits do not depend on α, and hence they are higher. Moreover, recall from the
previous section that in the presence of a duopolistic used good market, new good
price, PUdn, and profits, ΠdU(S), are increasing in α. Therefore, there exists an αdm such
that for α ∈ [αdm, 1], PUdn > PUmn, and an αc such that for α ∈ [αc, 1], PdU(S) > PmU(S).
Basically, intersupplier competition keeps the prices down, whereas the increased
valuation keeps the demand up. The NSN segment boosts the demand to a level such
that the market expansion effect dominates the price competition effect, leaving sup-
pliers better off even under the duopolistic market structure. In summary, this section
highlights the implication of a duopolistic used good market vis-à-vis a monopolistic
one (which has been commonly studied in literature). The important economic effect
of competition in a secondary market is that it creates a segment of consumers, NiSNj,
who are willing to buy their less preferred, but additional, new good due to their
increased valuation for a good. Segmenting the market lowers the average cost of
owning (or renting) a good, thus creating more buyers. In effect, the used good option
is like a rebate coupon that reduces the net price consumers actually pay for the new
good. The purchase price of a new good effectively becomes equal to the discounted
sum of two prices—the new good price in period 1 minus the expected used good
price in period 2.
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Empirical Evidence
OUR ANALYTICAL MODEL PROVIDES us with two testable assertions. First, we show
that an increase in the availability of used goods leads to a decrease in the new good
price. Prior work and conventional wisdom suggests that opening a used good market
would lead to an increase in new good prices. Irrespective of the value of the holding
utility, h, once the effect of duopolistic competition is taken into account, new good
prices need not increase with the establishment of secondary markets. Second, we
show that the used good price increases in the new good price.
The online book market provides a rich arena to test the robustness of these two
results. It is one of the fastest growing industries on the Internet. Online book sales
grew from essentially nothing in 1995 to more than $2.5 billion in 2003 [18]. Today,
such sales make up between 7.5 percent and 10 percent of total book sales in the
United States. Our data set is compiled from publicly available information on new
and used book prices on Amazon.com. The data is gathered using automated Java
bots to download and parse HTML pages from Amazon.
The data were collected in two separate samples. The first was collected from Sep-
tember 2002 to March 2003, and the second was collected between April and July
2004. Our total data set includes approximately 400 individual book titles. This panel
of books includes an equal number of books from each of five major categories: New
York Times (NYT) best sellers, former NYT best sellers, Amazon best-seller computer
books, best-selling textbooks, and “new and upcoming books.” Current best sellers
were included because of their popularity, high sales, and their relevance to publisher
price discrimination strategies (using phased releases of binding types). We randomly
selected books appearing in the NYT best-sellers list. Using the LexisNexis database,
we included a sample of NYT best sellers from 1999 to analyze the effect of time on
the availability and pricing of used books. Former best sellers should have a larger
base of copies in circulation than other titles, potentially increasing the number of
used copies for sale. Best-selling computer books represent one of the most popular
book categories sold online, and are also subject to demand shocks based on the
version updates over time and changes in technology. Our best-selling computer books
were selected at random from the best-seller list at Amazon. Textbooks, which are
also included in our survey, have similar demand characteristics to computer books—
both in terms of popularity and demand shocks. Our textbooks are selected at random
from facultyonline.com best sellers. Our final category is new and upcoming books.
This category allows us to examine the development of used book markets for recent
releases over a period of time. Our total data sample includes 41,994 observations.
For each of the books we tracked that is uniquely identified by an International
Standard Book Number (ISBN), we collect data on new book prices charged by
Amazon, as well as new and used book prices among Amazon marketplace sellers.
Besides prices, for each offer listed, we collect the book’s self-reported condition,
and the seller’s marketplace rating (a star rating provided by prior customers). Our
control variables include the log of the time since the book was released (Datediff),
the condition of the lowest-priced used book (Condition), the seller rating for the
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lowest-priced used book (SellerRating), and the log of the number of used books
offered for sale for a particular book (CountofUsed). Since Amazon provides four
different conditions (or quality) levels of used books (like new, very good, good, and
acceptable), our data include all used book offers on a given date for each condition.
Clearly, since including each used book offer in our regression is impractical, from
the set of offers we selected the minimum price for each of these four possible condi-
tions of a given used book. This was done because the minimum price for a specific
condition of a used book strictly dominates any other price offers at that condition.
Thus we derived four new variables constituting the minimum prices of used books,
denoted by PUsedi(i ∈ [2, 5]) in Table 1, which contains the summary statistics for our
data. Formally, we use the following terminology: Used2 for a book of quality “like
new,” Used3 for quality “very good,” Used4 for quality “good,” and Used5 for a
book of “acceptable” quality. Finally, we also derived the minimum price on a given
day for all offered used books (across all conditions) and denote it as PUsedMin. We
denote the quality of a used book by the variable Condition. Note that given the
manner in which we code the Condition variable, an increase in condition denotes a
decrease in the used book quality.
Table 2 lists summary statistics for our data. All prices listed are the lowest prices
for each category for each ISBN. We did this because many of the used and new non-
Amazon prices in our data set were substantially higher than the lowest price for the
same condition listed for the same book on the same date.
Table 1. Parameter Estimates for the PAN and PUsedMin Models
Dependent Dependent
Variable variable PAN variable PUsedMin
Constant 2.9*** 2.83***
(158.0) (33.7)
PAN — 0.38***
(15.28)
PNAN 0.02*** 0.13***
(6.6) (7.65)
PUsedMin 0.016** —
(15.68)
CountofUsed –0.004*** –0.075***
(–3.72) (–11.5)
SellerRating 0002 0005
(0.363) (0.43)
Condition –002*** –0.013***
(–2.34) (–5.6)
Datediff –0.017*** –0.35***
(–10.65) (–44.1)
R2 0.45 0.37
Notes: The t-statistics are given in parentheses. Using a log linear functional form to estimate this
regression gives qualitatively similar results. <<note for *** and **>>
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Based on the propositions developed in earlier sections, we have the following two
testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 (Used Good Secondary Market Availability): An increase in the
availability of used goods in a secondary market leads to a decrease in the new
good prices.
Hypothesis 2 (New Good–Used Good Price Increase): Given the presence of
used books, all else being equal, an increase in the new good price leads to an
increase in the used good price.
To test the first assertion, we compare new book prices with changes in the avail-
ability of used books. Fortunately, in our data, there are a significant number of ob-
servations for both scenarios: when there are many used books offered and when
there are fewer used books offered. Therefore, we estimate
AN NAN UsedMin bt bt btbt bt btP P P CountofUsed X1 2 3 1 4 .−= β + β + β + β +ε (8)
Table 2. Guide to Notations
Variable Interpretation
θ Consumer types uniformly distributed between (0, 1).
θi Market share cutoff of firm i where i ∈ (1, 2).
Dij Market demand of firm i from good j where j ∈ (A, B).
q Utility from buying a used good for type θ.
h Utility from holding a used good for type θ.
α Cross-product purchase affinity for a consumer.
kN New good commission charged by supplier.
kU Used good commission charge by retailer.
SA, SB Supplier A and B, respectively.
N A single-period action of buying a new good.
H A single-period action of holding onto a used good.
S A single-period action of selling a used good.
U A single-period action of buying a used good.
I A single-period action of remaining inactive.
PNimn New good price of supplier i in a monopoly without used goods.
PNidn New good price supplier i in a duopoly without used goods.
PUmn New good price in a monopoly with used goods.
PUdn New good price in a duopoly with used goods.
PUms Used good price in a monopoly.
PUds Used good price in a duopoly.
ΠmN(S) Supplier profit in a monopoly without used goods.
ΠdN(S) Supplier profit in a duopoly without used goods.
ΠmU(S) Supplier profit in a monopoly with used goods.
ΠdU(S) Supplier profit in a duopoly with used goods.
ΠmN(R) Retailer profit in a monopoly without used goods.
ΠdN(R) Retailer profit in a duopoly without used goods.
ΠmU(R) Retailer profit in a monopoly with used goods.
ΠdU(R) Retailer profit in a duopoly with used goods.
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Given the nature of our data (cross-sectional plus time series) we use a fixed effects
regression model to test our hypothesis.13 The second hypothesis claims that, given
the presence of used books, used book prices are higher when new books are priced
higher. To alleviate any endogeneity concerns, we ran the following regression using
lagged values (by time period).
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
UsedMin AN NAN b tbt b t b t
b t b t
P P P CountofUsed
X
1 2 3 11 1
4 1 1 .
−− −
− −
= γ +γ +γ
+ γ +ε (9)
The variables are indexed by book, b, and time, t. In Equation (8), the independent
variables are a vector of “new” non-Amazon marketplace prices PNAN, a vector of
Amazon marketplace prices PUsedMin, a vector of the number of used goods available,
and a vector of other control variables (X). In Equation (9), the independent variables
are Amazon price PAN, a vector of “new” non-Amazon marketplace prices PNAN, a
vector of the number of used goods available, and a vector of other control variables
(X). Since we estimate a fixed-effects model, book-specific idiosyncrasies are cap-
tured in the fixed-effect constant. The estimates are presented in Table 3.
The data supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. In Equation (8), the coefficients of the vari-
able, CountofUsed is negative and significant, indicating that the increase in the avail-
ability of a used book leads to lower new book prices. Further, in Equation (9), the
coefficient of the term PAN is positive, implying that if the new book price increases,
then the used book price also increases.
Conclusion
THE ONGOING HEATED DEBATE BETWEEN suppliers and retailers has focused on the
supposed damage that secondary markets established by online retailers are inflicting
on royalty payments and supplier profits. Amazon’s secondary market is flourishing,
with more consumers discovering that buying used information goods, such as books,
CDs, videos, and DVDs, could lead to significant cost savings. However, the general
consensus is that used good sales cannibalize new good sales and, consequently, are
harmful to suppliers, thereby ruling out the possibility of harmonious coexistence for
all traditional players in these markets.
Using a game-theoretic model, we investigate the competitive implications of these
newly emerging secondary markets on supply-chain profits and new good prices. We
show that the major motivation of the retailer to establish a used good market is to
capture additional surplus from those consumers who were unable to buy in the new
good market. This enables the retailer to effectively practice quality-based price dis-
crimination at no additional cost. Our model also highlights that unlike a monopolis-
tic market, intersupplier competition can be beneficial to suppliers in the presence of
a secondary market, rather than harmful. This occurs because the presence of used
goods subdues the rate at which suppliers can increase the new good prices with
consumers’ cross-product purchase affinity. This factor affects the market in such a
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way that the market expansion effect compensates for the price competition effect.
Thus, we show that contrary to popular perceptions, the presence of a used good
market is beneficial for suppliers, too, under a relatively wide range of conditions.
When merchandized as a deep discount option to an otherwise inflated new good
price, electronic secondary markets offer consumers an extremely attractive option to
increase their valuation for a new good, thereby spurring additional new good sales.
In sum, the insights from this model help to explain several interesting market
phenomena, including (1) the profitability of concurrent sales of new and used goods
for suppliers—that is, why secondary markets may not be detrimental for them if one
considers the market expansion effect; (2) the possibility of lower new good prices
when there are secondary markets, under both monopolistic and competitive sce-
narios; and (3) the strategic role of used goods commission fees and their differential
impact on equilibrium prices and profits for suppliers and retailers, under monopolis-
tic and duopolistic markets. Using data from Amazon, we test two of our assertions
from the analytic model and also provide empirical estimates of the effect of an elec-
tronic secondary market on new book prices.
Our analysis has implications for suppliers who sell through intermediaries but
cannot appropriate direct gains from secondary markets. As long as there is more
than one supplier, and consumers are willing to buy another new good, a secondary
market can be beneficial for suppliers. Thus, there may be significant gains in pro-
ducer welfare from the additional sales. Indeed, retailers, such as Amazon, and sup-
pliers such as book publishers as well as movie studios and record labels, stand to
benefit and earn a slice of the growing pie created by lower search and transactions
costs of electronic secondary markets. As more consumers migrate online and adopt
such resale practices, this indirect market expansion effect can further alleviate the
damages incurred by suppliers from the direct effect of cannibalization of new good
by used goods.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
PAN 24.16 26.17 1.95 209.99
PNAN 17.74 23.08 0.01 209.99
PUsed2 (like new) 15.71 21.98 0.01 194.28
PUsed3 (very good) 11.26 20.82 0.01 207.60
PUsed4 (good) 11.24 17.44 0.01 200.00
PUsed5 (acceptable) 7.86 17. 13 0.01 222.25
PUsedMin (all conditions) 13.14 19.15 0.01 151.95
CountofUsed 81.15 131.78 1 753
SellerRating 3.97 1.65 0 5
Condition 2.33 1.14 1 5
Datediff 717.7 1,336.22 0 21,235
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Another implication from our model is that while deriving their optimal pricing
strategies, suppliers need to keep in mind the effect of a positive holding utility that
some consumers derive from keeping their used goods, instead of necessarily selling
them. This is especially true in the case of music CDs or textbooks where consumers
are likely to listen to a song or read the book repeatedly, compared to a fiction book
or a DVD whose utility diminishes at a much faster rate. Ignoring this aspect of con-
sumer behavior will erroneously drive up the price beyond the optimal value. Fur-
ther, this caveat also holds true for a retailer deriving its optimal used good commission,
because the extent to which a retailer benefits from establishing a secondary market
is dependent on it. As pointed out earlier, the retailer’s optimal used good commis-
sion is a function of the extent of quality degradation and the value that buyers derive
from holding the used good through the course of its life. It is conceivable that these
parameters vary among information goods, and the broader context of durable goods
in general. So, careful consideration needs to be given by the retailer while fixing its
commissions due to its strong effect on consumers’ buying and selling patterns. From
the supplier’s perspective, the used good commission is critical due to its interdepen-
dency with new good commission.
One limitation of our model is that we do not consider more than two suppliers and
that we do not consider an n-period model. However, our intuition is that the main
effect of cross-product purchase affinity (α) driving our results on prices and profits
carry through with multiple suppliers or multiple periods. A preliminary analysis
reveals that incorporating multiple suppliers or multiple resale periods only restricts
the space of α where the supplier benefits from used good markets. Another interest-
ing extension would be to incorporate consumer heterogeneity in a second dimen-
sion, such as by introducing a distribution for the quality degradation parameter, q. In
such a scenario, rather than all used good sellers selling goods at the same quality, q,
there would be a distribution that characterizes the seller-specific degradation of the
quality of the good. We hope that our study inspires more interest and paves the way
for these future explorations.
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NOTES
1. The problem arises because durable goods sold in the future affect the future value of
units sold today, and, in the absence of the ability to commit, the monopolist does not internal-
ize this externality. Having sold a certain quantity, a firm still faces a residual demand for the
good, consisting of those consumers who place a value on the good lower than the current
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market price. As a result, the firm has an incentive to lower its price to attract these customers.
But rational consumers factor in future price reductions into their current willingness-to-pay.
2. We use the terms secondary market and used good market interchangeably in this paper.
3. We use the term duopolistic to denote the fact that there are two firms competing in the
market, but only for a subset of the consumers who are willing to buy more than one good.
Similarly, we will use the term monopolistic to denote the fact that neither firm faces any
competition in its market.
4. In our model, the suppliers choose the new good price. In the traditional channel litera-
ture with a decentralized distribution structure, allowing the retailer to choose the price leads to
the well-known double marginalization problem and results in an increase in new price by an
amount proportional to the wholesale price [20]. Because the used prices are determined by
market-clearing conditions, this leads to an increase in the used price as well. As a result, the
qualitative nature of our results remain unchanged.
5. This eventually results in both suppliers selling in each market, which makes this case
less attractive for us to analyze.
6. We do not consider the channel coordination issues as it is not the focus of this paper.
There is a large literature on channel coordination mechanisms in marketing and operations for
the supply chain or sale channel, using tools such as “return policies” or “buy-back policies.”
See for example, Cachon [7].
7. A comparison of the supplier profits reveals that for all α < 0.33, suppliers are better off
under a duopoly compared to a monopoly. However, since our main focus is on how used good
markets affect supply-chain profitability, we do not analyze this case in detail.
8. This is similar to the approach taken by Desai and Purohit [9]. Unlike their model, where
the manufacturer chooses optimal quantities, in our model, the suppliers choose optimal prices.
9. This implies that below this cutoff value of h, the suppliers would find it profitable not to
have the NH segment. We derive this cutoff value of h in the Appendix and show that it is quite
low for the whole range of used quality parameter q.
10. Note that prior research by Rust [19] has indicated that used good markets will cause
new good prices to increase. In our model, if consumers are unwilling to pay suppliers for
second-period utility (i.e., if h is equal to zero), then the new good price is pn* = (1 + q – kq)/2,
as shown in the Appendix. Hence, in our model as well, opening a used good market results in
the new good price increasing from 1/2 to pn*, which is consistent with prior findings.
11. Proof of Proposition 3 has been omitted in the Appendix, because it is immediate.
12. With indirect appropriability, the seller can extract all the rents from a user by charging
a higher price for the original because the total willingness-to-pay for the whole is higher.
13. We ran the same regression using dummy variables for capturing information on book
types—that is, we used dummies for fiction books, nonfiction books, hardcovers, paperbacks,
textbooks, best sellers, former best sellers, and computer books. These serve as control vari-
ables in addition to Datediff. Again, there was no qualitative change in the results.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (Monopoly Prices Without Used Goods)
WE SHOW AN UPPER LIMIT OF α such that beyond that value, a supplier would no
longer offer the monopoly price. Suppose one supplier, say SA (selling good A), de-
cides to deviate from its monopoly price PNmn to P1, and get some type B users to buy
good A. It is immediate to show the demand D1A for good A from type A consumers
at P1 is 1 – θ1A = 1 – (P1/(1 + h)).
Due to the lower price charged by SA, some consumers in a type B market will find
it incentive compatible to buy good A, as long as it satisfies their individual-rational-
ity constraints. Hence, the type B market splits into two segments, such that high θ
consumers buy their preferred good B, while remaining buyers purchase good A.
Therefore, we have
( ) ( ) ( )B N B Bmnh P h P h P1 1 1 2 11 1 1 0,θ + − ≥ αθ + − αθ + − ≥ (A1)
where θ1B is the consumer indifferent between buying good B and good A, whereas
θ2B is the consumer indifferent between buying good A and not buying at all. From
this, we have
( )( ) ( )
N
mnB BP P P
h h
1 1
1 2, .1 1 1
−
θ = θ =
+ −α α +
Now all type B consumers between θ1B and θ2B buy from SA. Hence, demand D1B for
good A in a type B market at P1 is
( )( )
N
mnB B A P PD
h
1
1 1 1 .1 1
α −
= θ −θ =
α −α +
Thus, the total demand for SA is given by the demand from its own market and from
a portion of its competitor’s market. Therefore, total demand is D(P1) = D1A + D1B.
Hence, the profit is given by
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
N
mnA
N
P P
S P k P
h
1
1 1
11 1 .
1 1
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫α −⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬Π = − − +
⎢ ⎥+ α −α⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
(A2)
Optimizing Equation (A2) after substituting the monopoly price PNmn gives us the
optimal price P1* = (α(3 – 2α)(1 + h))/(4(1 + (1 – α)α)). Substituting P1* in Equation
(A2), we get the optimal supplier profit:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
A
N
hS k
2
2
3 2 1
1 .
16 1
− α α +
Π = −
− α
(A3)
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Comparing this with monopoly profits given by Equation (1) and solving for α
provides the critical value of α = 0.61, beyond which SA finds it profitable to offer P1*.
It is trivial to show that the deviated price P1* < PNmn as one would expect by construc-
tion.
Proof of Lemma 2 (Duopoly Prices Without Used Goods)
Consider the equilibrium in which some consumers are willing to buy both goods.
Suppose supplier SA charges a price PNAdn and supplier SB charges a price PNBdn. Con-
sider SA’s market. From the individual-rationality and the incentive-compatibility con-
straints, we get the consumer in SA’s market who is indifferent between buying both
good A and B, or only good A as
( ) ( ) ( )
A B AA N A N A N
dn dn dnh P h P h P1 1 11 1 1 .θ + − + αθ + − ≥ θ + − (A4)
Similarly, the consumer indifferent between buying good A and not buying at all is
given by
( )
AA N
dnh P2 1 0.θ + − ≥ (A5)
From Equations (A4) and (A5), we have the following cutoffs:
( )
B AN N
dn dnA AP P
h h1 2
, .
1 1
θ = θ =
α + +
Now, total demand for SA is given by D(PNAdn, PNBdn) = D1A (demand in its own
market) + D1B (demand in SB’s market). Hence, the profit for SA is ΠA(S) = PNAdn(1 –
θ2A) + PNBdn(1 – θ1B). From this, the profit-maximizing price PN*dn is (α(1 + h))/(1 + α).
Profit at this price is also ΠA(S) = (α(1 + h))/(1 + α). By symmetry, the optimal price
of SB is also (α(1 + h))/(1 + α) and profit is equal to ΠB(S) = (α(1 + h))/(1 + α).
Proof of Proposition 1 (New Good Price and Supply-Chain Profits)
We have assumed that the holding utility h is high enough for the NH segment to
exist. Recall that these are the consumers who buy a new good in period 1 and then
hold onto the used good in period 2. We now proceed to derive the critical value of h
below which the supplier will price the new good in a way such that the NH segment
does not exist. In particular, for the NH segment to exist, it must be that the utility that
the agent with θ = 1 obtains from buying the new good at time 1 and holding it at
time 2 strictly exceeds the utility from buying the new good at time 1 and selling it at
time 2. That is,
( )U U Umn mn U msP h P k P1 1 1 ,− + ≥ − + −
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or PUms < h/(1 – kU). Otherwise, there is no NH segment. Suppose PUms > h/(1 – kU).
Then θ1 = (PUmn – (2 – kU)PUms)/(1 – q) and θ2 = PUms/q. From the market-clearing
condition, we find that
( )
( )( )
U
mnU
ms
U
q P q
P
q k
2 1
.
1 3 2
− +
=
+ −
Plugging this back in the supplier’s profit equation and maximizing it with respect
to the new good price, this gives the optimal new good price
( )UU
mn
q k q
P
1
.
2
+ −
=
This proves that in the absence of the NH segment—that is, when no consumer de-
rives any positive utility from holding the used good—the new good price increases
in the presence of the secondary market. From this, supplier profits turn out to be
( ) ( )( )
( )
N U
U
k k q
k q
2
1 1 1
.
4 4 3 2
− + −
+ −
Comparing this with the supplier profits when there is an NH segment, we find that
the critical value of h is given by (q2(2 + kU2 – 3kU))/(2 + 4q – 3kUq). For any value of
h above this, the supplier will find it profitable for the NH segment to exist. A numeri-
cal analysis reveals that for kU = 0.15 and q ∈ (0, 1), the critical value of h ranges
from (0.01, 0.25). Thus, for a wide region in the parameter space, it is optimal for the
supplier to price the new good in a way that ensures the existence of the NH segment.
1. Comparing the prices of the new good with and without used good markets, we
find that prices in the absence of used goods markets ΠNmn(S) will be higher than that
with used goods markets ΠUmn(S) if and only if
( ) ( )( )
( )
U
U
q h k q h
h q k q
1
0.
2
− − −
>
+ −
Recall that (1 – kU)q > h. Hence, this expression is positive.
2. Comparing the profits of the supplier with and without used good markets, we
find that profits in the absence of used goods markets ΠmN(S) will be higher than
those with used goods markets PmU(S) if and only if
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
N U
U
k q h k q h
h q k q
1 1
0.
4
− − − −
>
+ −
Since (1 – kU)q > h, this expression is positive.
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Comparing the profits of the retailer with and without used good markets, we find
that profits in the presence of used good markets ΠmU(R) will be higher than those
without used goods markets ΠmN(R) if and only if
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
U N U N U N
U
k q h k hk q h k k k q
h q k q
2
2
1 2 1
4
− − − − − −
+ −
is positive. Since (1 – kU)q > h, this implies that the first term in the previous expres-
sion is positive. Solving for the value of kU, which makes the second term positive
also, it is easy to show that this critical value is given by kU ≥ (kN(q2 – h2))/(q((2 –
kN)h + kNq)).
Proof of Proposition 2 (Effect of Used Good
Commission on Prices)
Recall Equations (2) and (4), which give the new good prices set by the supplier and
optimal supplier profits. With some algebraic simplification, it can be shown that the
first-order derivatives and their corresponding signs reduce to the following expres-
sion.
( )
( )( )
U U
ms mn
U
U UU
dP dPhq hq q h h q k q
dk dkh q k q
2
2
2 0 0.= > = − + − >
+ −
Proof of Proposition 4 (Competitive New Good Price)
First, we outline all possible strategies. Apart from the four strategies stated in the
Proposition 4, consumers could adopt the following two strategies: NSU and IN. We
show that both strategies are dominated by others. (1) Utility from following an NSU
strategy UNSU = θ(1 + αh) – PUdn – PUds + (1 – kU)PUds. (2) Utility from following an IN
strategy UIN = θ(1 + h) – PUdn.
Comparing NH and NSU, we find that UNH – UNSU = θ(h – αh) + kUPUds > 0. Hence,
NSU ≤ NH. Also, utility from IN = θ(1 + h) – PUdn, which is the same as that from NH.
Since buying a particular new good in either period gives the consumer the same
utility, it is reasonable to assume that consumers prefer buying it in the first period
rather than the second period. This is like a tie-breaking rule. Hence, all consumers
prefer NH to IN. This leads to the four possible strategies as stated in Proposition 4.
From the demand–supply clearance condition for used goods, we get
( )
( )
U U
dn dn
U
ds
U
P P
h q h
P k
h q q h
1 2
1
1
1 1
0.11 1
1 1
− + +
+ − α− −α
− =
−
+ +
+ − α− −α
(A6)
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Similarly, we get PU2ds(PU2dn, PU1dn). Plugging these back into the suppliers’ profit
Equation (6) and maximizing it w.r.t. price PU1dn, we get the reaction function
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
U U
U dn dnU U
dn dn
U
k h P P q h
P P h q
q k h
22 2
1 2
1 2 2 11
2 2 .
2 1 1 1
⎛ ⎞+ − + − +⎜ ⎟
= + − +⎜ ⎟+ − +α +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
Similarly, we get the reaction function for the other supplier PU2dn(PU1dn). Solving
these two reaction functions simultaneously gives us the optimal new good price
PU*dn, given by Equation (7). From this and Equation (A6), we get the optimal used
price:
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
U
ds
U U U
U U U
P
q k q h k h k q
q k q h h k q k q h
*
22 2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2 2 1 1
.
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
=
− − −α + −α α+ − − − − −α+α
− − − −α +α+ α− + − − +α+ α
The supplier’s optimal profit is given by
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
U
d
N U U U
U U U
S
k q k h h q k q q h q k
q k q h h k q k q h
22
2
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 4 2
.
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
Π =
− + − + + α −α − α+ − +α+ − + − α+ − + +α
− − − −α +α+ α− + − − +α+ α
(ii) With some algebraic simplification, it can be shown that the corresponding
signs of the first-order derivatives are as follows.
(i)
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
U
dn
U U
U
q h h q q qdP
dk h k q
q q h q h h q
h k q
2*
2
2
2
2 2 4 2 3
2 1
2 1 2 1
.
2 1
− − − − +α + − + α
=
+α+ α −
− + − − − − −
=
+α+ α −
This is negative, because h < q < 1.
(ii)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
U
Udn
U
h h h q k qdP
d h k q
2*
2
1 4 1 1 2
.
2 2 1
+ + + − + −
=
α + α+ + −
This is positive, because (1 + h – q) > 0.
(iii) The derivative of PU*ds with respect to PU*dn is derived using the implicit func-
tion theorem as follows. Let the left-hand side of Equation (A6) be denoted as F.
Then, we have
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( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
UU U
dnds dn
U
U Udn U
ds
dF
q h h h q PdP dP
dF k q q h h k q qdP
dP
21 1
21
1
1 1
.
1 1 1 1 2
+ α− + + −
= =
− − − −α +α− + − − α
With some algebraic simplification, it can be shown that the denominator becomes
equal to (1 – kU)(1 – q)q + hq(1 – kU) + (1 + h)(α + αh – h), which is positive. Thus, the
sign of the above derivative is positive.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Optimal New Good Price Comparison)
The optimal new good price under a duopolistic used good structure is given by
Equation (7). The new good price under the monopolistic used good regime is given
by Equation (2). Taking the difference between the two and solving for the roots of
this Equation, which makes it strictly positive, gives us the critical value of α:
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
n
U U U U
U
h k q q k q h k q h k q q q
h h h hq q k
3 2
2
4 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 8 7 2
.
2 1 2 2 1
α =
+ − − − − + − + + − − −
+ + − + −
Now, we know from Proposition 6 that (dPU*dn)/dα > 0. Further, with some alge-
braic simplification, it can be shown that the numerator of this expression is positive.
Since the denominator is also positive, this implies that αn is positive.
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